Atlee recalls Lord Wavell .
Lord Mountbatten takes office .
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More over in another significant move , Great Britain govt on 20th February, 1947 announced their intention of transferring power to
Indian hands by June 1948 so Mountbatten
was running short of time, he had to build consensus between warring
factions . MountBatten had to start immediately.
Mountbatten begins consultation with Indian
national Congress and Muslim league
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Note:-**This blogger is of the opinion that
partition happened for good , had partition not happened like Kashmir
whole India would have been burning,so Gandhi getting sidelined during
negotiation was a blessing in disguise. **
Jinnah, on the other
hand, had managed to convince Muslims into believing that their
interests will be best served only by having a separate Muslim country.
Jinnah's Muslim league had virtually swept Muslim dominated seats in
recently concluded provincial assembly seats. Popular belief is that Muslims who stayed back were supporters of India. Much contrary to that majority of then Muslims who stayed back were supporters of Jinnah and
Pakistan. .
Encouraged by Muslim support he was getting for his
call for separate Pakistan Jinnah was now adamant on a separate Islamic state .
The
Congress leadership(Sardar Patel , Nehru) on the other hand, by now had
realized that it would not be possible to prevent Partition but at the
same time did not want concentrated areas of Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab and
Bengal be taken away from them. Patel in particular by this time was convinced
that a partnership between the Congress and the League in the administration of
the country was impossible. Either the one or the other could alone govern and
it was obvious that the League by itself could not do so. At the same time, he realized that the Congress will not be able to run provinces which had a
Muslim majority as muslim population was totally against Congress.
Plan for transfer of power:-
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Reaction to Transfer of power:-
Once the outline of Mountbatten's plan became known
to the people in Delhi and outside, feverish activity took hold of them. Among
the first to act were the Hindu and Sikh legislators of the Punjab who met in
New Delhi and passed a resolution in favor of division of that Province.
Jinnah, on the other hand continued to insist on
an undivided Punjab and Bengal and called the partition of these Provinces as
'a sinister move actuated by spite and bitterness'. He also coerced Mountbatten that the option to the
NWFP electorate would be limited to choice for Pakistan or India and Not independent NWFP and
there would be no option for Independence. Khan Abdul Gaffar khan's to have an interdependent NWFP was was ignored .
.
Once the Transfer of power plan became public
the gradual migration of Hindu families from the Punjab and
N.W.F.P. started brought in its trail problems to Delhi and other places.
Stream of these refugees and their tales of woe and misery
began to make an impression in their mood of bitterness, disillusionment
and at times desperation, refugees undoubtedly
accentuated the problem of communal tension which had
already reached its peak.
On the other hand,
the Muslim League was organizing itself on a militant basis
everywhere. With the support that it had of a
section of Government and
an important
element in the
administrate machinery, the situation was full of explosive
possibilities.
The press was divided into
three, Anglo-Indian,
Nationalist and Muslim and in
particular the cleavage between the latter two in newspapers and
periodicals in regional languages was talking the armed camp
mentality from the inner counsels of Government to the forums of expression of
public opinion. The general freedom of expression that prevailed was being
grossly abused and both sides indulged through
insinuations, innuendoes, veiled threats and covert designs was the favorite
pastime of those days, of in fuming public opinion and widening communal
cleavage.
Personal note: Given the kind of communal
tensions prevailing it was prudent for Mountbatten to delay partition plan .
This blood bath could have been avoided by proper planning . Mountbatten was in
hurry because of deadline given by British govt , but why blame only
Mountbatten even congress leaders didn't press for a
planned exchange of refugees .
Further negotiations for transfer of power:-
Quoting from My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel -V
Shankar(v Shankar was personal secretory of Sardar Patel):-
"It was this sojourn to the hills(V.Shankar is refering to Simla
negotiation) , which was intended to be a period of rest and recreation that
marked a turning point in the course of constitutional negotiations. Lord
Mountbatten happened to divulge to Pandit Nehru the plan which he had sent to
His Majesty's Government, whereupon Pandit Nehru exploded and was desperately
looking for an alternative. At the crucial moment he brought forth the solution
that had been discussed earlier with Sardar. Finally Lord Mountbatten changed
his plans and the scheme of Partition on the basis of two Dominions was
conceived and drawn up. I have only to add to that story what transpired at
Delhi where Sardar was every day disturbed and agitated at the prospect of
anarchy that was threatening to engulf the country and was waiting for a call
from Simla. He knew that discussions on constitutional problems would
inevitably take place and that a crisis was about to develop. His mind was
already made up and when the telephone call came from Simla he was ready to
deal with it. That incident is very vivid in my mind. Maniben(Sardar's daughter
and unofficial personal secretory), Sardar and myself collected in Sardar's
office room after the call came, I think on 9/10 May. The reception was bad
because apart from the poor condition of telephone communications between Simla
and Delhi, there was interference from Muslim League eavesdroppers. Sardar, who
was a little hard of hearing could not follow what V.P.Menon was saying and at
the other end Nehru could not hear distinctly what Sardar was saying. Hence the
instruments were passed on to V.P. Menon and me. Both of us then began to
conduct our conversation as the interpreters of the two illustrious
personalities near us, Pandit Nehru near V.P.Menon and Sardar near me. After
Menon had given me a gist of what had transpired, which I dutifully conveyed to
Sardar, he asked me on behalf of Pandit Nehru to ascertain from Sardar what his
views were on the new plan, Sardar conveyed through me to Pandit Nehru that
there was no alternative but to accept that plan and that under it we lost only
a fraction of India instead of risking the loss of the whole of it. He also
told Pandit Nehru that so far as he was concerned he felt that the transfer of
power on the basis of Partition and two Dominions was the surest means whatever
peace was possible in this sub-continent and of enabling three-fourths of India
to seek its own way of a secular life and economic and administrative
development. Pandit Nehru seemed to have received this statement of Sardar's
views with satisfaction and relief but he asked Sardar whether the Working
Committee and Gandhiji would accept it. Sardar's reply was characteristic of
him. He told Pandit Nehru that he accepted full responsibility for seeing the
scheme through the Working Committee and so far as Gandhiji was concerned he
had no doubt that after initial doubts and skepticism he would give way and see
their point of view. Pandit Nehru finally asked Sardar if in that case he
should go ahead and Sardar's reply was a very firm affirmative."
A conversation which shaped the future of negotiation from congress side with British India.
Important point here to note is that both Sardar and Nehru had come to the
conclusion that partition was the only viable option , Nehru though was
convinced about partition was worried about how his party colleagues more
importantly Gandhi would take this . Sardar on other hand commanded the maximum
support in working CWC , he was confident that he would be able to convince CWC
. Gandhi still believed that partition wasn't an option , he also was of the
opinion that if partition is unavoidable then let it happen after British leave
India. How ever Jinnah was adamant on Transfer of power only after partition
hence Gandhi's solution wasn't a practical one.
Disclaimer:
Article is based on two books :-
1.My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel by V Shankar
2.Transfer of power in India by V.P.Menon
Our politicians
ReplyDeleteare so engrossed with playing dirty politics that they leave no stone unturned. They play this game even on the grave matters like someone’s death and their burial.